I. Introduction
Assessing existing international law rules concerning the suppression of piracy or terrorism -Acts using a ship as a weapon against navigational safety; -Using the sea as a means of providing logistic support for terrorist activities; -Using the sea as a platform to launch a strike against a state or to use a ship as a weapon against a state; -Transport of weapons of mass destruction without a terrorist background.
International treaty law as well as customary international law has developed mechanisms to suppress acts of violence at sea, such as piracy or other acts directed against ships, airplanes or platforms. However, new developments seem to indicate that these mechanisms do not embrace modern threats. In particular these mechanisms did not explicitly provide for measures taken in response to ships being used as weapons. This situation has changed with the adoption of the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention). 3 Designing such measures had to strike a balance between the freedom of navigation and the security interests of individual states as well as the ones of the community of the states as a whole. Further, it has been 1 The most general definition of the notion of terrorism is to be found in the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999 (ILM 39 (2000 , 270: article 2, paragraph 1 b of that Convention reads: "Any ... act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or any other person not taking part in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. the scope of application of those rules considerably. 12 This excludes acts of violence being treated as piracy if these acts are committed in order to destabilize a government or to cause unrest and terror with the view to blackmailing a government or for religious or ethnic grounds -typical attitudes of modern terrorism -being treated as piracy. The same is true for liberation movements, insurgents etc. who have seized a ship for political reasons. The meaning of the word "illegal" in the definition of piracy in article 101 of LOS Convention is unclear; the legislative history is not enlightening. It is for the courts of the prosecuting states to decide whether the act of violence under consideration was illegal under international law or the national law of the prosecuting states.
Another limitation stems from the fact that only acts on the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones 13 may be qualified as pirate acts but not those committed in the coastal waters of a state. The rationale of this limitation is that it is for the coastal state concerned to fight pi-
racy. But what is the situation if the coastal state concerned is, for whatever reason, not able to control its coastal sea as is the case for failed states?
Actions against pirates may be taken in accordance with article 105 of LOS Convention. According to article 107 of LOS Convention a pirate ship may be seized only by a warship or a military aircraft or another ship in government service. The courts of the respective states will decide upon the adequate penalties and will also take a decision on the confiscation of the pirate ship and its cargo. What is important is that piracy belongs to the few crimes, including also the crime of genocide, to which the principle of universality applies. This means that the right to take enforcement measures against pirates is vested in all states and not only in states which have suffered the particular act of violence.
Taking the wording of the LOS Convention literally it seems that the possibilities for fighting piracy effectively are limited. Currently this is the prevailing view. 14 There are good reasons for taking a different position, though. The LOS Convention offers quite some options in the fight against terrorist acts at sea.
It has to be acknowledged that the central provision, namely article 107 of LOS Convention, is worded as an option for states to take up rather than as an obligation incumbent upon them. Although article 98 of LOS Convention is intended to cover distress as the consequence of a natural disaster or of a collision at sea, it reflects the existence of a general obligation to safeguard human life at sea and in this respect it is applicable here. This possibility is a limited one, though. It does not embrace, in general, the mandate to suppress piracy in a particular area.
According to general international law, rescue actions may be taken by a warship to assist a ship under attack in the coastal waters of another state under the principle of humanitarian intervention. Although this approach is currently disputed, 15 it has to be acknowledged that such interference in the sovereignty of the state concerned is less prevalent than in cases where the intervention takes place in the territory of the given state. Moreover, the fact also has to be taken into account that it is the obligation of the coastal state concerned to protect ships against attacks from pirates. If the warship of another state intervenes on behalf of a ship carrying the same flag it can at least presume that the coastal state would agree to such action.
Nevertheless, the power to intervene in such cases, and in particular the jurisdiction to prosecute the offenders, rests primarily with the coastal state concerned. The right to intervene is, accordingly, a limited one. The same applies in respect of the pursuit of a pirate ship if the act of piracy has been committed on the high seas and the pirate has sought shelter in foreign coastal waters. In general, the coastal state concerned has to give its consent to such pursuit. Such consent may be presumed, given the obligation of the coastal state concerned to cooperate in the suppression of piracy.
However, these possibilities allow foreign states to intervene on the spot only, whereas the suppression of piracy in general remains under the authority of the coastal state concerned. No other state may act on its behalf without its explicit consent. 16 It is evident that the effective- it seems more appropriate to consider invoking article 3, para. 1(e), of the Rome Convention, according to which it is an offense to destroy or seriously damage maritime navigational facilities or to seriously interfere with their operation if such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship. The acts referred to are the following:
III. Mechanisms to Face New Challenges of Terrorisms and to
22 See note 3; on its legislative history see Tiribelli (note 21) at 146 et seq.
-using against or on a ship or discharging from a ship any explosive, radioactive material or biological, chemical or nuclear weapon in a manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;
-discharging, from a ship, oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance, in such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury or damage;
-using a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage;
-transporting on board a ship any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat to cause, death or serious injury or damage for the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act;
-transporting on board a ship any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon, knowing it to be such a weapon;
-transporting any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement;
-transporting on board a ship any equipment, materials or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.
The transportation of nuclear material is, subject to specific conditions, not considered an offense if it is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under the con- The new instrument also makes it an offense to unlawfully and intentionally injure or kill any person in connection with the commission of any of the offenses in the Convention; to attempt to commit an offense; to participate as an accomplice; to organize or direct others to commit an offense; or to contribute to the commission of an offense.
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The new crimes covered mean that it goes beyond fighting terrorism; it may also be used to enforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is this aspect in particular which has been most controversially discussed.
The new instrument requires parties to take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity (a company or organization, for example) to be made liable and to face sanctions when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity, committed an offense under the Convention.
Assessment
Although the Rome Convention is broad in respect of its territorial scope of application, and has been broadened as far as the offenses covered are concerned by the 2005 Protocol, the sanctions mechanism it provides for is limited. -board their own vessels in their respective internal waters and territorial sea areas as well as on the high seas, if there is reasonable ground for suspicion that they are engaged in proliferation activities; -consider to provide consent to boarding of their vessels by the authorities of other participating States;
-take measures against foreign vessels in the sea areas covered by their territorial sovereignty and in their respective contiguous zone.
The legal basis of the PSI -frequently characterized as an international partnership of states 31 -has not been clarified fully. It is being claimed that the PSI conforms to the law of the sea and the various jurisdictional standards articulated in the LOS Convention. 32 One may further argue that it -in general -reflects that attitude of the UN Security Council to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 33 As far as its format is concerned it constitutes a collection of bilateral agreements constituting a collective partnership without amounting to an international organization.
Most problematic is subparagraph 4(d) of the Statement, which calls on PSI participants:
"To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected or carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry." It is required that such passage is prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Apart from that the legislative history of the resolution reveals that it was not meant to cover indictments of vessels.
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The legal situation in respect of international straits is similar to the one discussed so far. ternally. It is not possible to consider the rules on state responsibility in isolation from the primary obligation they are assisting to enforce. In this respect it has to be noted too that all references to interdiction were removed from the resolution upon the initiative of China.
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This is a clear indication that the Security Council was not meant to be used as a basis to take action against foreign ships.
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This cannot later be remedied by having recourse to the rules on state responsibility. It is only for the Security Council to mandate such actions to be undertaken.
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Apart from that it has been discussed whether that interdicting a foreign vessel amounts to a breach of Article 2, para. 4, UN Charter or whether it constitutes a police action only.
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IV. Approaches under General International Law to Suppress Terrorist Activities at
Sea and the Transport of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introductory Remarks
It has for a long time been neglected, that terrorism at sea or the transport of weapons of mass destruction may be fought on the basis of general international law. In that respect general international law supplements the rules so far described.
Self-Defense
States targeted by terrorists from the sea may resort to self-defense. In S/RES/1368 ( If a ship has been brought under the control of terrorists with the aim of using it as a weapon, the flag state is under an international obligation to intervene, given the worldwide and unconditional condemnation of terrorism by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The question is, though, whether the state in question will be in a position to do so or to do so before the threat posed by such a ship materializes. If this is impossible, the flag state concerned not only has the option but in fact is under an obligation to request assistance from other states.
A different line of argumentation may also be considered. Ships in the hands of terrorists constitute a mortal danger to the citizens of the targeted state and a duty to intervene can be based on the general principle of safeguarding human life. This is not only a principle governing the law of sea but can equally be based upon on the obligation to protect human life under the international regime for the protection of human rights. This is of relevance also in those cases where the flag state is not able to react but ships of other states are. Interference in the sovereignty of the state whose flag the ship in question is flying can, at least, be justified by the fact that the flag state concerned is under an international obligation to intervene with the view of suppressing terrorism.
The flag state may consent to such intervention. As a result, the intervention would clearly conform to international law. In cases where military intervention against a ship under a foreign flag is the only means of protection against terrorists, the flag state is obliged to give its consent to such intervention. It may even be possible to consider going one step further and arguing that, in cases of a clearly identified terrorist threat to a ship, the consent to intervene, with the aim of ensuring that the terrorist threat does not materialize, may be presumed.
Finally, one further approach may be considered. Only ships flying the flag of a state are, on the high seas, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state. Is that equally true for ships controlled by terrorists and targeted as weapons? It is worth considering whether, since the flag state has lost control of them; such ships should not be treated as ships without nationality. This would mean that any state would be entitled to arrest and seize such ships. However, it must be borne in mind that article 104 of the LOS Convention provides for the retention of nationality of pirate ships and it would be necessary to establish why and under which cir-cumstances ships taken over by terrorists or equipped by terrorists to serve as weapons lose their nationality.
The main problem connected with any attempt to reduce the danger which ships in the hands of terrorists may pose to states, their citizens or navigation in general is that of obtaining reliable information early enough to intervene. This information has to pertain to the fact that a particular ship is posing such a threat and against which target. The possibility of states" considering -as is the practice with air traffic approaching the United States of America -requesting ships to communicate details about crew, passengers, cargo and destination to their This reasoning is substantiated if a comparison with the legal situation prevailing under the international law of maritime warfare is made. The naval forces of the belligerent parties may search ships of states not involved in the armed conflict to make sure that they are not supporting the activities of the other party. This is all the more applicable if it is considered that the Security Council has condemned terrorism and has made it mandatory to cooperate in its suppression.
Whether such activities in given maritime zones are acceptable and in particular whether such naval activities are effective is a different matter.
Precautionary measures have been taken on the part of port authorities in an attempt to provide stricter control of ships" cargo in general. It may be too late to investigate the cargo at the ports of destination. Therefore a policy has been developed to check cargo at the port of departure. The container security initiative set up by the United States attempts to extend the zone of security outward by shifting security and screening activities to the border of the exporting country. The main problem with this initiative is that it only protects the United States and that it discriminates all transport not coming from the ports cooperating in the Container Safety Initiative. Apart from that it has to be stated that -although terrorism is a universal phenomenonthe United States is just cooperating with not much more than 30 states in this respect. This approach however, makes any attempt to find a truly universal solution -including, for example, IMO -futile. 
IV. Conclusions
A perusal of the existing international instruments to be used for the suppression of international terrorism at sea indicates that they are in a state of transition. This is due to different reasons. The most prominent of them are that the community of states has to deal with a new type of organized crime and a new type of offender. International terrorism works within an international network which makes it easy to switch the basis from which operations are launched. Modern forms of communication allow weapons and other necessary supplies to be transported to the targeted state. The criminals, in particular those carrying out such attacks, are not threatened by the fear of subsequently finding no shelter and being prosecuted. The latter, however, has hitherto been the principal mechanism for suppressing terrorist activities.
The Convention on the Law of the Sea and subsequent special international agreements has responded to this new challenge. They should be seen and assessed as a whole.
This legal development clearly indicates that international law as such and the procedures for amending it are flexible enough to react to new challenges. What is remarkable is the shift of emphasis to be witnessed in these new regimes namely the focus on precautionary measures. However, it is impossible to end at a clearly positive note. Although piracy as well as terrorist activities at sea are clearly of an international nature only some of the legal responses are developed, so far. In particular the proliferation security initiative as well as the container security initiative does not reflect a multilateral approach but rather a unilateral one where individual states cooperate on the basis of bilateral agreements. This not only weakens its effectiveness -at least so far as its scope is concerned -but also jeopardizes the multilateral efforts undertaken against some forms of violence at sea.
